



Regional Economic Outlook: Transitions, Vulnerabilities & Opportunities

Presentation at the Mubadala GE Cap Offsite Meeting

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- **Changing Economic and Financial Geography**
- **MENA Transitions and Transformations**
- **Macroeconomic Outlook of the UAE/ Dubai**
- **Vulnerabilities, Opportunities & Synergies**

Two Speed Economic Growth Forecasts (IIF, Dec 2011) DIFC

Global Output Growth

percent, y/y

| | 2010 | 2011f | 2012f | 2013f |
|---------------------------|------------|------------|------------|------------|
| Mature Economies | 2.8 | 1.3 | 0.9 | 1.9 |
| United States | 3.0 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.4 |
| Euro Area | 1.8 | 1.5 | -1.0 | 1.2 |
| Japan | 4.5 | -0.9 | 1.9 | 1.8 |
| Other Mature | 2.7 | 1.8 | 1.1 | 2.0 |
| Emerging Economies | 7.2 | 6.0 | 5.4 | 6.1 |
| Latin America | 6.2 | 3.9 | 3.4 | 4.2 |
| Argentina | 9.2 | 6.5 | 3.5 | 3.0 |
| Brazil | 7.5 | 2.8 | 3.0 | 5.0 |
| Mexico | 5.4 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 3.5 |
| Emerging Europe | 4.5 | 4.6 | 2.7 | 3.6 |
| Russia | 4.0 | 4.0 | 3.7 | 4.0 |
| Turkey | 9.0 | 8.5 | 3.2 | 4.5 |
| Asia/Pacific | 9.1 | 7.7 | 7.4 | 7.9 |
| China | 10.4 | 9.3 | 8.6 | 9.0 |
| India | 8.5 | 7.0 | 6.5 | 7.0 |
| Africa/Middle East | 4.3 | 4.6 | 3.4 | 4.1 |
| South Africa | 2.8 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 3.7 |
| World | 4.4 | 3.2 | 2.8 | 3.7 |

Based on market exchange rates

Global Current Account Balance


\$ billion

| | 2010 | 2011f | 2012f | 2013f |
|-----------------------------|------|-------|-------|-------|
| United States | -471 | -463 | -405 | -397 |
| Euro Area | -61 | -57 | 4 | 37 |
| Japan | 196 | 104 | 113 | 131 |
| Other Mature Economies | -21 | -40 | -37 | -35 |
| Emerging Economies (IIF 30) | 365 | 324 | 162 | -9 |
| Africa / Middle East | 65 | 174 | 114 | 82 |
| Latin America | -45 | -45 | -90 | -113 |
| Emerging Europe | 0 | -26 | -65 | -77 |
| o/w Russia | 71 | 83 | 22 | 12 |
| Emerging Asia | 345 | 222 | 203 | 99 |
| o/w China | 305 | 205 | 183 | 95 |
| Other Countries* | -8 | 132 | 163 | 273 |

* Includes global discrepancy

Euro Area: Maturing Debt for Selected Countries in 2012

€ billion




2012 will be a year of transition – political (elections across the globe), economic and social.

The IIF projects a **decline in growth** for both advanced economies' and emerging economies **during 2012, before showing a pickup in 2013**. Global growth is expected at **2.8% in 2012 & 3.7% in 2013**.

- Real GDP growth in the **advanced economies** – including US, euro area, & Japan- is forecast to **decline slightly, from 1.3% in 2011 to about 0.9% in 2012**.
- **Activity will be more robust** in some advanced economies, especially **in those with close ties to emerging Asia**.
- In **emerging economies**, capacity constraints, policy tightening, and slowing foreign demand are expected to dampen growth to varying extents across countries. As a result, growth in these economies will **drop from about 6.0% in 2011 to about 5.4% in 2012**. Growth is forecast at **6.1% in 2013**.

Emerging markets have contributed 2/3 of global growth since 2002


- The world's economic centre of gravity in 1976 was a point West of London, somewhere towards the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.
- But in the 30 years since then, that centre of gravity has drilled 1800 km - one third of the planet's radius - deeper into the Earth's crust, away from the US & towards the East.
- In less-turbulent times, between 2002 and 2007:
 - China's average contribution to world economic growth approached 66% that of the US;
 - China and India's together, almost 85%;
 - East and Southeast Asia's, more than 130%.




Emerging Markets - Resilient, but Slowing

- **Emerging economies** real GDP growth is expected to slow from around 6.0% in 2011 from 7.2% in 2010 on capacity constraints and anti-inflationary tightening of monetary policies.
- Additionally, with global downside risks rising, emerging markets could also face a sharp reduction in demand, a reversal in capital flows and a rise in funding costs that could impact the financial soundness of domestic banks.

Net Fund Flows to Emerging Markets
(billions of U.S. dollars; weekly flows)



Emerging Market Private Capital Inflows, Net
\$ billion



Structural Change in Financial Geography




| | 1999 | 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011(E) |
|--------------------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|---------|
| World Market Cap | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| United States | 46.0% | 46.9% | 49.8% | 47.2% | 44.7% | 42.7% | 39.3% | 36.3% | 30.8% | 33.6% | 31.8% | 31.4% | 32.4% |
| Rest of Developed | 45.7% | 45.0% | 41.2% | 42.1% | 43.8% | 44.2% | 44.3% | 44.0% | 40.9% | 42.4% | 39.0% | 40.6% | 41.0% |
| Emerging Markets | 8.3% | 8.1% | 9.3% | 10.6% | 11.9% | 12.8% | 16.4% | 19.7% | 28.3% | 24.0% | 29.2% | 27.9% | 26.7% |
| BRIC | 2.2% | 3.1% | 3.2% | 3.4% | 4.4% | 4.2% | 5.5% | 9.4% | 16.9% | 12.7% | 17.3% | 16.4% | 15.6% |
| Rest of Emerging | 6.1% | 5.0% | 6.1% | 6.8% | 7.2% | 8.6% | 11.1% | 10.1% | 11.3% | 11.3% | 11.9% | 11.6% | 11.0% |
| of which MENA | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.6% | 0.8% | 1.2% | 1.8% | 3.0% | 1.7% | 2.2% | 2.3% | 1.9% | 1.9% | 1.7% |

Source: Standard & Poor's (Data as of June 2011)

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MENA: Current Growth versus Pre-crisis Average DIFC

(Percentage point difference in compound annual rates of change between 2011–12 and 2000–07)



Source: IMF World Economic Outlook, Sep 2011

Arab World Outlook: Main Macroeconomic Indicators

| | GDP (\$ billion) | Real GDP Growth (% change) | | | Fiscal Balance (% GDP) | | | Current Account Balance (\$ billion) | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|-------------|------------|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|---|--------------|--------------|
| | 2011f | 2010 | 2011f | 2012f | 2010 | 2011f | 2012f | 2010e | 2011f | 2012f |
| Arab World | 2180 | 4.7 | 4.9 | 3.6 | 0.9 | 4.5 | -0.3 | 148.1 | 296.5 | 201.7 |
| Oil Exporters | 1677 | 4.7 | 6.5 | 4.0 | 3.2 | 8.1 | 2.1 | 170.1 | 321.8 | 225.0 |
| Bahrain | 26 | 4.5 | 2.2 | 3.3 | -6.6 | 0.2 | -3.1 | 0.8 | 2.6 | 2.5 |
| Kuwait | 168 | 2.9 | 4.4 | 3.1 | 19.8 | 20.8 | 10.1 | 36.9 | 59.9 | 43.4 |
| Oman | 73 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 4.5 | 3.2 | 9.4 | 3.4 | 6.6 | 13.6 | 7.4 |
| Qatar | 174 | 18.3 | 18.0 | 5.3 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 0.4 | 14.8 | 35.2 | 26.9 |
| Saudi Arabia | 571 | 3.8 | 5.8 | 3.7 | 5.6 | 10.4 | 3.2 | 67.1 | 132.1 | 89.7 |
| UAE | 368 | 3.2 | 4.4 | 3.1 | -1.4 | 5.8 | 2.3 | 24.3 | 49.2 | 42.6 |
| Algeria | 189 | 3.2 | 4.0 | 3.9 | 3.8 | 0.3 | -3.2 | 10.0 | 22.4 | 11.5 |
| Iraq | 108 | 0.8 | 8.2 | 8.4 | -11.1 | 7.6 | -3.1 | -6.7 | 7.0 | 0.9 |
| Oil Importers | 503 | 4.5 | -0.4 | 2.3 | -5.9 | -7.7 | -8.0 | -22.0 | -25.3 | -23.3 |
| Egypt* | 232 | 4.8 | -1.4 | 2.0 | -8.1 | -9.6 | -10.2 | -4.3 | -3.7 | -3.5 |
| Jordan | 28 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 3.2 | -5.6 | -5.7 | -4.7 | -1.3 | -2.4 | -2.0 |
| Lebanon | 41 | 7.0 | 1.8 | 3.8 | -5.5 | -8.3 | -9.6 | -8.0 | -7.0 | -7.0 |
| Morocco | 100 | 3.8 | 4.3 | 3.9 | -4.5 | -5.5 | -5.1 | -4.2 | -5.6 | -4.3 |
| Syria | 57 | 4.5 | -6.0 | -3.0 | -3.8 | -6.7 | -8.2 | -2.1 | -3.6 | -3.9 |
| Tunisia | 45 | 3.7 | -1.7 | 4.0 | -1.4 | -4.5 | -3.1 | -2.1 | -3.0 | -2.5 |
| Memoranda: | | | | | | | | | | |
| GCC | 1380 | 5.2 | 6.7 | 3.7 | 4.8 | 9.3 | 3.3 | 150.5 | 292.5 | 212.5 |
| Libya | 34.0 | 4.3 | -56.0 | 55.0 | 13.1 | -34.3 | -15.6 | 16.4 | -8.0 | -2.1 |

e = estimate; f = IIF forecast

*Egypt growth rates have been adjusted to a calendar year basis to make them consistent with other countries, while figures for inflation and the fiscal and current accounts are on a fiscal year basis.

- MENA Growth is expected at 3.6% in 2012 compared to 4.9% in 2011 but with wide disparity in prospects between oil exporters & oil importers.
- Recent developments in the region highlight the need to ensure that economic growth is both ***inclusive*** and has a ***trickle-down*** impact.
- There is a need to **reduce chronically high unemployment and wide income inequality** within countries and across countries of the region.
- While reinforcing the government sector has been the initial step, one should ensure it does not lead to a ‘crowding out’ of the private sector.
- Populist measures + hand outs = low productivity; begs the question: **what when support is phased out?**
- With the ongoing Eurozone sovereign crisis, MENA countries dependent on Europe face additional problems (*Nearly 50% of cross border loan syndications in the region comes from European banks and massive deleveraging in Europe could mean these institutions will be virtually absent in the market*).
- Need to focus on: **structural reforms and developmental policies** (incl. infrastructure) that encourage private sector participation, tackle job creation, lower income inequality, greater inclusiveness, lift economies to higher growth trajectories over the LT **through institutional reform & improved governance**


MENA Regional Turmoil => Increased Divergence DIFC

Divergence b/n oil exporters, oil importers & labor exporters

- GCC growth - boosted by high oil output & prices; Bahrain's protests will impact growth in 2011 while in KSA, growth will be boosted by the populist fiscal measures.
- With investment continuing to lag, government-supported consumption will remain the primary growth driver across the region.
- Downside risk remains that private sector activity will be subdued/crowded out.
- GCC announced that it has welcomed the bids of Jordan & Morocco to join the Union.


Arab World: Real GDP Growth

percent



Arab World: Stock Market Performance

Dow Jones indices, rebased end-2010=100




Policy Responses to Turmoil: Costs

| | Measures | Size (% of GDP) | Type of spending |
|-----------|---|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Bahrain | BHD2,660 handouts, 25% cut in housing loans | > 1.5 | Current |
| Kuwait | KWD1,000 handouts, free food rations until end-March 2012 | >2.5 | Current |
| Oman | 43% rise in minimum wages, unemployment benefit of USD390, employment for 50,000 Omanis | >1.5 | Current & Capital |
| Qatar | Boost in basic salaries and social benefits for state civilian employees by 60%; Military staff of officer rank will receive a 120% increase in basic salaries and benefits, with other ranks getting a 50% rise; a one time payment of 10 billion riyals toward its pension fund and another 10 billion for retirees' subscriptions. | >5 | Current |
| S. Arabia | Increased minimum wage, bonus/unemployment payments, more funding for housing loans, construction of 500,000, housing units, new public jobs, extended social security, etc | >23 | Current & Capital |
| UAE | Infrastructure program for northern emirates, 70% increase in military personnel pension, food subsidies | >1.0 | Current & Capital |

Characteristics of Successful Transitions

- On average growth declines by around 3% during transition, but rebounds to or above its pre-transition rate within one to two years.
- The average investment rate declines with a delay, by less than 2%, but takes at least 5 years to recover.
- Private investment bottoms out more quickly than public investment and leads the recovery.


Average growth & investment performance during a successful transition



Source: Freund and Mottaghi (2011). *Note: Mean growth performance during more than 40 successful transitions based on information in the database of the Polity IV Project, which includes an index of regime characteristics, scaled from 0 (authoritarian) to 10 (democracy). Successful transitions are those for which the index must jump by at least 5 points, and the new higher level must be sustained for at least 5 years to qualify as a transition. Thus, this data includes only countries with complete transitions. The graph records performance for a balanced panel of 42 countries with data for 11 years. See Annex Table 1 for the list of countries in the panel.

- Regime transitions have taken different paths in different countries.
- In some cases mass movements have succeeded in opening up the possibility for a rapid and peaceful regime change;
- In others, the path towards democracy is faced with stronger resistance by parts of the ruling elites - appears longer and more uncertain
- Results indicate **peaceful transitions to democracy lead to democracies with better average protection of property rights and civil liberties compared to democracies that emerge after violent conflicts.**

Violent and peaceful transitions to democracy




Source: Cervellati et.al (2011): "Violence, democratisation and civil liberties: The new Arab awakening in light of the experiences from the "third wave" of democratisation", voxeu.org, March.

- Determinants of democratisation scenario: evidence suggests that **higher inequality before the transition is associated with a significantly larger likelihood of violent civil conflicts** during the regime change.
- Evidence documents **significant interactions between inequality and political freedom for the quality of democracies.**
- Evidence from democratisation transitions during 1970-2003 suggests that **countries that rely less on natural resources and have lower inequality are more likely to experience nonviolent democratic transitions.**
- Lessons for Arab world:
 - Regime shifts will follow different transition paths in different countries.
 - Level of violence which characterises the regime transition may persistently affect the future prospects of democracy


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Policy response has largely been populist spending encouraging consumption => Growing threat to fiscal sustainability & external balance

Oil Exporters: Government Spending



Breakeven Brent Oil Prices Will Rise Further in 2012




Source: IIF Regional Overview, Oct 2011

| \$ billion | Tourism | | FDI | |
|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------|
| | 2010e | 2011f | 2010e | 2011f |
| Total | 30.9 | 22.3 | 18.5 | 8.6 |
| Egypt | 11.6 | 8.0 | 6.5 | 1.5 |
| Jordan | 3.4 | 2.9 | 1.7 | 1.4 |
| Lebanon | 3.0 | 2.3 | 5.5 | 3.4 |
| Morocco | 6.7 | 6.8 | 1.7 | 1.4 |
| Syria | 3.5 | 0.6 | 1.8 | 0.4 |
| Tunisia | 2.7 | 1.6 | 1.3 | 0.5 |

- *The short-term outlook is still subject to unusually large uncertainties: political & security situation + growing uncertainty about external demand.*
- *Remittances, tourism, FDI will decline, as will output (given high unemployment rates, budget deficits)*

- *Need for fiscal consolidation greatest among oil-importing economies*
- *Pro-cyclical fiscal expansion could further crowd out needed private investment, perpetuating the problems with job creation in the private sector.*



Oil Importers: External Financing Needs*



*Includes grants and net external borrowing. Actual figures for 2010. Forecasts for 2011 and 2012 assume official reserves in months of import cover remain the same as in 2010.

Strong Infrastructure Spending

Projects worth more than \$1.8 trillion are planned or underway across the GCC according to MEED.



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- UAE/ Dubai benefitted from: Higher oil prices/ production; Increased trade with EMEs; Arab regional turmoil highlighting UAE/ Dubai as a safe haven leading to inflow of tourists/ capital; Stronger domestic demand/ retail sales
- Real Estate remains Weak; lower prices & rents are leading to new equilibrium. Large real estate supply overhang + continued retrenchment in the construction and real estate sectors => the share of construction and the real estate sector in Dubai's GDP declined from 30% in 2007 to 23% in 2010.

UAE: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators

| | 2008 | 2009 | 2010e | 2011f | 2012f |
|-----------------------------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Nominal GDP, \$ billion | 315 | 270 | 303 | 367 | 369 |
| Real GDP, % change | 4.8 | -3.5 | 3.2 | 4.4 | 3.1 |
| Hydrocarbon | 1.8 | -8.5 | 4.6 | 7.0 | 3.0 |
| Nonhydrocarbon | 6.3 | -1.0 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 3.1 |
| Abu Dhabi | 7.0 | 2.6 | 3.5 | 3.6 | 3.7 |
| Dubai | 5.7 | -4.5 | 1.7 | 3.1 | 2.8 |
| CPI Inflation Rate, avg., % | 12.3 | 1.8 | 0.6 | 1.2 | 1.8 |
| Bank Lending, % change | 45.0 | 2.4 | 1.3 | 2.0 | 3.5 |
| Fiscal Balance, % GDP | 16.4 | -12.6 | -1.4 | 5.6 | 2.1 |
| Current Account, % GDP | 7.4 | 3.1 | 8.0 | 13.1 | 11.3 |

e = estimate; f = IIF forecast

UAE: Financial Sector Soundness Indicators

| | <i>percent</i> | | | | |
|--|----------------|-------|-------|------|--------------|
| | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | August 2011e |
| Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets (Tier I + Tier II) | 14.0 | 13.3 | 19.2 | 20.8 | 21.0 |
| o/w: Tier I | 12.4 | 12.3 | 15.4 | 16.1 | 16.4 |
| NPLs/Total Loans | 2.9 | 2.5 | 4.8 | 6.3 | 7.5 |
| Provisions to NPLs | 100 | 101 | 85 | 87 | 81 |
| Return on Assets | 2.0 | 1.8 | 1.3 | 1.4 | ... |
| Return on Equity | 19.3 | 15.6 | 7.9 | 8.4 | ... |
| Loans to Deposits | 97.5 | 107.7 | 103.6 | 98.0 | 98.3 |


e = estimate

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Economic

| DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS | POLITICAL FACTORS | ECONOMIC FACTORS |
|---------------------------------|------------------------|--|
| Fraction of population under 25 | Voice & Accountability | Food Price Inflation |
| Youth Unemployment rate | Political rights | GDP per capita |
| Age Dependency ratio | Corruption | Military Spending as a percentage of GDP |
| Infant Mortality Rate | Civil Liberties | |
| | Press Freedom | |


Youth Population vs. Youth Unemployment



MENA Vulnerability Index (2010)



MENA Vulnerability Index



Source: DIFC Economics

DOMESTIC

- Political Transformation
- Governance
- Social Safety Nets
- Educational Transformation
- Women Empowerment
- Fiscal Transformation
- Economic Diversification
- Job Creation

REGIONAL

- MENA Bank for Development & Reconstruction
- GCC Common Market & Common Currency
- Regional Economic Integration
- Develop Local Currency Financial Markets
- Shift Economic Policy Toward Asia & EMEs

INTERNATIONAL

- Resolve Israel-Palestine Conflict
- Aid
- Trade
- Investment
- Economic Focus not Military Engagement

Transformational agenda for MENA is about Structural Change

MENA region/ GCC countries need to achieve their own transformation - need an Arab Renaissance and a new Development paradigm:

- 1. Shift in trade, investment & financial policies towards Asia and EMEs:** integrate into New Silk Road
- 2. Regional Economic Integration:** infrastructure; payment systems; financial markets
- 3. Educational transformation:** weak link between education & economic growth, income distribution & poverty reduction.
- 4. Transformation of Role of Women:** if FLFP were same level as in OECD (60%) we could increase GDP by 20-25%!
- 5. Economic diversification**
- 6. Transformation of Role of the State and greater Private sector role:** job creation, R&D and Innovation
- 7. Develop Local Currency financial Markets =>**Access to finance for SMEs, FOEs
- 8. Build Capacity & Institutions for Economic & Financial Management**
- 9. Fiscal reforms:** revenue diversification/ Expenditure rationalisation
- 10. Political & Governance transformation**

- **Second Tier Equity Market** for Small & Medium Enterprises & Family-owned businesses
- **Warehouse Receipts Financing** at the DIFC/ Collateralised Securities Lending
- Role of a regional financing & capacity building institution: **MENA Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ Emirates Development Bank**
- Renewable Energy & the development of a **Clean Energy Cluster at the DIFC**
- **Partnerships with SWFs** are important: involvement in reconstruction and development in the region through infrastructure projects (increasingly important given the problems in Europe, lack of access to finance from traditional means/ partners)



Thank You!
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