

Comments on UAE-Turkey CEPA in Zawya, 30 May 2023

Aathira Prasad's comments (posted below) on the prospects for UAE-Turkey CEPA in the backdrop of President Erdogan's election victory, appeared in the article titled "[With Erdogan's win, UAE looks to strengthen trade relations with Turkey](#)" on Zawya dated 30th May 2023.

"Erdogan's victory will ensure continuity in planned economic and trade cooperation," said Aathira Prasad, Director, Macroeconomics, at the Dubai-based consultancy Nasser Saidi & Associates.

"For the UAE, the CEPA with Turkey will support its diversification efforts – both in terms of expanding into new emerging markets (i.e. trade partners) and an increased focus on the non-oil sector," Prasad told Zawya.

"The UAE is likely to push for greater cooperation on newer, up-and-coming avenues such as clean energy and adoption of digital technologies, including AgriTech, alongside the usual suspects of real estate and construction," Prasad added.

"There has to be a concerted effort from Turkey's part to convince foreign investors: the lira has already dipped to a record low of 20 to the dollar and the central bank's net foreign reserves are already in negative territory (first time since 2002). Unless the central bank raises interest rates, the currency will likely fall further – an unsustainable option for the medium-term and a worrisome prospect for investors," said Prasad.

How to save Lebanon from

looming hyperinflation, Article in The National, 31 Jul 2020

The article titled "How to save Lebanon from looming hyperinflation" was published in The National on 31st Jul 2020. The original article can be accessed [here](#) & is also posted below.

How to save Lebanon from looming hyperinflation

To bring the country's economic chaos to an end, it is important to examine how it all began

In June 2020, Lebanon's inflation rate was 20 per cent, month-on-month. In other words, prices in the country were, on average, 20 per cent more than they were a month before. Compared to a year earlier, in June 2019, they had nearly doubled.

Lebanon is well on its way to hyperinflation – when prices of goods and services change daily, and rise by more than 50 per cent in a month.

Hyperinflation is most commonly associated with countries like Venezuela and Zimbabwe, which this year have seen annual inflation rates of 15,000 per cent and 319 per cent, respectively. Lebanon is set to join their league; food inflation surged by 108.9 per cent during the first half of 2020.

When hyperinflation takes hold, consumers start to behave in very unusual ways. Goods are stockpiled, leading to increased shortages. As the money in someone's pocket loses its worth, people start to barter for goods.

What characterises [countries with high inflation](#) and hyperinflation? They have a sharp acceleration in growth of the money supply in order to finance unsustainable

overspending; high levels of government debt; political instability; restrictions on payments and other transactions and a rapid breakdown in socio-economic conditions and the rule of law. Usually, these traits are associated with endemic corruption.

Lebanon fulfils all of the conditions. Absent immediate economic and financial reforms, the country is heading to hyperinflation and a further collapse of its currency.

How and why did this happen?

Lebanon is in the throes of an accelerating meltdown. Unsustainable economic policies and an overvalued exchange rate pegged to the US dollar have led to persistent deficits. Consequently, public debt in 2020 is more than 184 per cent of GDP – the third highest ratio in the world.

The trigger to the banking and financial crisis was a series of policy errors starting with an unwarranted closure of banks in October 2019, supposedly in connection with political protests against government ineffectiveness and corruption. Never before – whether in the darkest hours of Lebanon's civil war (1975-1990), during Israeli invasions or other political turmoil – have banks been closed or payments suspended.

The bank closures led to an immediate loss of trust in the entire banking system. They were accompanied by informal controls on foreign currency transactions, foreign exchange licensing, the freezing of deposits and other payment restrictions to protect the dwindling reserves of Lebanon's central bank. All of this generated a sharp liquidity and credit squeeze and the emergence of a system of multiple exchange rates, resulting in a further loss of confidence in the monetary system and the Lebanese pound.

Multiple exchange rates are particularly nefarious. They create distortions in markets, encourage rent seeking (when someone gains wealth without producing real value) and create new opportunities for cronyism and corruption. Compounded by the Covid-19 lockdown, the result has been a sharp 20 per cent contraction in economic activity, consumption and investment and surging bankruptcies. Lebanon is experiencing rapidly

rising unemployment (over 35 per cent) and poverty rates exceeding 50 per cent of the population.

With government revenues declining, growing budget deficits are increasingly financed by the Lebanese central bank (BDL), leading to the accelerating inflation. The next phase will be a cost-of-living adjustment for the public sector, more monetary financing and inflation: an impoverishing vicious circle!

We are witnessing the bursting of a Ponzi scheme engineered by the BDL, starting in 2016 with a massive bailout of the banks, equivalent to about 12.6 per cent of GDP. To protect an overvalued pound and finance the government, the BDL started borrowing at ever-higher interest rates, through so-called “financial engineering” schemes. These evolved into a cycle of additional borrowing to pay maturing debt and debt service, until confidence evaporated and reserves were exhausted.

By 2020, the BDL was unable to honour its foreign currency obligations and Lebanon defaulted on its March 2020 Eurobond, seeking to restructure its domestic and foreign debt. The resulting losses of the BDL exceeded \$50 billion, equivalent to the entire country’s GDP that year. It was a historically unprecedented loss by any central bank in the world.

With the core of the banking system, the BDL, unable to repay banks’ deposits, the banks froze payments to depositors. The banking and financial system imploded.

As part of Lebanon’s negotiations with the IMF to resolve the situation, the government of Prime Minister Hassan Diab prepared a [financial recovery plan](#) that comprises fiscal, banking and structural reforms. However, despite the deep and multiple crises, there has been no attempt at fiscal or monetary reform.

In effect, Mr Diab’s government and Riad Salameh, the head of the central bank, are deliberately implementing a policy of imposing an inflation tax and an illegal “Lirafication”: a forced conversion of foreign currency deposits into Lebanese pounds in order to achieve internal real deflation.

The objective is to impose a ‘domestic solution’ and preclude

an IMF programme and associated reforms. The inflation tax and Lirafication reduce real incomes and financial wealth. The sharp reduction in real income and the sharp depreciation of the pound are leading to a massive contraction of imports, reducing the current account deficit to protect the remaining international reserves. Lebanon is being sacrificed to a failed exchange rate and incompetent monetary and government policies.

What policy measures can be implemented to rescue Lebanon? Taming inflation and exchange rate collapse requires a credible, sustainable macroeconomic policy anchor to reduce the prevailing extreme policy uncertainty.

Here are four measures that would help:

First, a “Capital Control Act” should be passed immediately, replacing the informal controls in place since October 2019 with more transparent and effective controls to stem the continuing outflow of capital and help stabilise the exchange rate. This would restore a modicum of confidence in the monetary systems and the rule of law, as well as the flow of capital and remittances.

Second is fiscal reform. It is time to bite the bullet and eliminate wasteful public spending. Start by reform of the power sector and raising the prices of subsidised commodities and services, like fuel and electricity. This would also stop smuggling of fuel and other goods into sanctions-laden Syria, which is draining Lebanon’s reserves. Subsidies should be cut in conjunction with the establishment of a social safety net and targeted aid.

These immediate reforms should be followed by broader measures including improving revenue collection, reforming public procurement (a major source of corruption), [creating a “National Wealth Fund”](#) to incorporate and reform state commercial assets, reducing the bloated size of the public sector, reforming public pension schemes and introducing a credible fiscal rule.

Third, unify exchange rates and move a to flexible exchange rate regime. The failed exchange rate regime has contributed


to large current account deficits, hurt export-oriented sectors, and forced the central bank to maintain high interest rates leading to a crowding-out of the private sector. Monetary policy stability also requires that the BDL should be restructured and stop financing government deficits and wasteful and expensive quasi-fiscal operations, such as subsidising real estate investment.

Fourth, accelerate negotiations with the IMF and agree to a programme that sets wide-ranging conditions on policy reform. Absent an IMF programme, the international community, the GCC, EU and other countries that have assisted Lebanon previously will not come to its rescue.

Lebanon is at the edge of the abyss. Absent deep and immediate policy reforms, it is heading for a lost decade, with mass migration, social and political unrest and violence. If nothing is done, it will become "Libazuela".

Nasser Saidi is a former Lebanese economy minister and first vice-governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon

LEBANESE CENTRAL BANK'S MONEY SURGE IS FUELLING INFLATION (%)



Source: Central Administration of Statistics, BDL, Nasser Saidi & Associates



To halt Lebanon's meltdown it is imperative to reform now, Article in The National, 4 Jul 2020

The article titled "To halt Lebanon's meltdown it is imperative to reform now" was published in The National on 4th Jul 2020. The original article can be accessed [here](#) & is also posted below.

To halt Lebanon's meltdown it is imperative to reform now

The country's currency has lost about 80% of its value against the US dollar and poverty and unemployment are on the rise


Lebanon is in the throes of an accelerating economic and financial meltdown. Unsustainable monetary and fiscal policies and an overvalued pegged exchange rate led to persistent fiscal and current account deficits.

Public debt which reached more than 155 per cent of gross domestic product in 2019, is projected rise to 161.8 per cent in 2020 and 167 per cent in 2021, according to International Monetary Fund estimates. That is the third highest ratio in the world after Japan and Greece.

Informal capital controls, foreign exchange licensing, freezing of deposits and payment restrictions to protect the dwindling reserves of Lebanon's central bank, precipitated the financial crisis, generated a sharp liquidity and credit squeeze and the emergence of a system of multiple exchange rates.

The squeeze is severely curtailing domestic and international trade and resulted in a loss of confidence in the monetary system and the Lebanese pound. Multiple exchange rates created distortions in markets and new opportunities for corruption. The result is a sharp, double-digit contraction in economic activity, consumption and investment, surging bankruptcies, and rapidly rising unemployment rates estimated at above 30 per cent.

A dangerous inflationary spiral has gripped the country with the currency's value against the dollar nosediving as much as 80 per cent. Inflation is on the rise and reached an annual 56 per cent in May, according to Lebanon's [Central Administration of Statistics](#). A Bloomberg survey of economists conducted in June, projects inflation will average 22 per cent in 2020 compared with a forecast of 7.7 per cent from a previous survey.



imum wage has shrunk from the equivalent of \$450 per month while food prices have surged. Since the end of a 15-year civil war in 1990, extreme poverty has hovered at between 7.5 to 10 per cent, while about 28 per cent of the population is poor, according to the World Bank. In November, the World Bank warned if the economic situation in the country worsened, those living below the poverty line could rise to 50 per cent. Given the collapse of the long-maintained peg, there is no anchor for expectations of the future value of the Lebanese pound.

The Central Bank of Lebanon does not have the reserves to support the pound. There is great uncertainty concerning the macroeconomic outlook, fiscal and monetary policies, exchange controls and structural reforms.

The government approved a rescue plan, the basis for negotiations with the IMF, but failed to set a credible roadmap for structural reforms and none of the promised reforms have been undertaken. There is a loss of confidence in the banking system and in macroeconomic and monetary stability. As a result, people want foreign currency to protect themselves, as a hedge against inflation and further depreciation of the pound.

Transfer restrictions have led to a sudden stop of capital inflows and remittances from Lebanese expatriates, who fear their transfers will be frozen. Remittances accounted for 12.9 per cent of GDP in 2019.

With capital and payment controls and lack of intervention by the central bank, the foreign exchange market became a cash

market with little liquidity, therefore highly volatile and subject to large fluctuations, rumours and panic.


Two short-term factors have compounded the currency crisis. The Covid-19 lockdown meant a loss of remittances that would have come in as cash. Media reports cite an accelerated smuggling of imported, subsidised commodities like fuel and wheat into neighbouring Syria these past months due to the increasing bite of international sanctions and a failing wheat harvest.

Panic prevails because of new US sanctions targeting Syria under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act (the Caesar Act) that came into effect last month. Syrians are trying to hedge against inflation and the depreciating Syrian pound by tapping Lebanon's forex market. In effect it is one market.

More fundamentally, Lebanon's rising inflation rates are feeding expectations of ever higher inflation rates, which along with the sharp decline in real income because of the deep recession, means a fall in the demand for money and lower demand for the Lebanese pound. As people try to shift out of the Lebanese pound, inflation rises, and the currency depreciates against the US dollar.

The vicious cycle is being fed by the monetary financing of budget deficits. Lebanon's fiscal deficit increased 26.90 per cent in the first four months of the year to \$1.75B from the year-earlier period. With the government unable to borrow from the markets, the central bank is financing the growing budget deficit and, increasingly, a growing proportion of government spending. The printing press is running, with a growing supply of Lebanese pounds on the market chasing a dwindling supply of US dollars. Hyperinflation looms.

LBP in the black market crossed 9k while M1 surges to over LBP 25trn



Source: M1 Banque du Liban ; black market rate <https://lirarate.com/> (updated 3rd Jul 2020)

requires urgent, decisive, credible, policy action. A capital control act should be passed immediately. That will help rebuild confidence in the monetary system and restore the flow of capital and remittances.

The prices of subsidised commodities and services (fuel, electricity) should be raised to combat smuggling and stem the budget deficit. Smart and targeted subsidies are more effective. The impact of removing general subsidies is less painful than financing budget deficits that accelerate overall inflation and exchange depreciation. Exchange rates need to be unified within a central bank and bank organised market.

Most important, is rapidly agreeing and implementing a financial rescue package with the IMF. That should be based on a comprehensive macroeconomic-fiscal-financial reform programme that includes structural reforms, debt, and banking sector restructuring, which would provide access to liquidity, stabilise and revive private sector economic activity.

Nasser Saidi previously served as Lebanon's minister of

economy and industry and a vice governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon. He is president of the economic advisory and business consultancy Nasser Saidi & Associates.

Bloomberg Daybreak: Middle East Interview, 2 Sep 2018

In the Sep 2, 2018 edition of Bloomberg Daybreak: Middle East, Dr. Nasser Saidi speaks about Turkey, Argentina, and more.

The original link to the full episode: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2018-09-02/bloomberg-daybreak-middle-east-full-show-9-2-2018-video>